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The world’s climate is changing due to anthropogenic causes; the average 
United States air temperatures are two degrees Fahrenheit higher than they
were just 50 years ago.1  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) estimates that the average temperature will continue to increase
by 2 to 11.5 degrees Fahrenheit by the end of the century.2  Climate change, 
along with increased global temperatures, also causes changes in local 
temperatures, precipitation, and wind patterns.3  In a 2014 report, the IPCC 
found recent climate-related extremes impacted localities through heat waves,
droughts, floods, cyclones, and wildfires.4 These extreme weather patterns
have affected human well-being and human systems, such as food production 
and water supply, and have emphasized human vulnerability.5 
While some of the world’s governments and industries have taken action
and enforced regulations attempting to mitigate the effects of climate change,
the United States has been slow to join.6  An increasing number of groups
and public figures in the United States, however, have started to strongly
advocate for climate change policy reform including stricter laws and policies.
The insurance sector is a group that can influence the United States to take 
actions to mitigate the effects of climate change.7 
The insurance industry comprises a significant part of the United States’
economy.8  In 2013, net premiums written for the property and casualty 
sector totaled $481.2 billion, total cash and invested assets in the property 
and casualty sector totaled $1.5 trillion, and the United States insurance
industry employed 2.5 million people.9  The key to a United States policy
change is through its wallet, and insurance companies are firmly in the 
American wallet.  The insurance industry can use its economic power to
influence the United States’ state and federal to advocate for climate change
policy reform.  The insurance companies will likely voice their concerns 
1. Union of Concerned Scientists, Climate Change in the United States: The 
Probative Cost of Inaction 1 (2009), UCSUSA.ORG, http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/
legacy/assets/documents/global warming/climate-costs-of-inaction.pdf.
2. CHRISTINA M. CARROLL ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND INSURANCE 12 (2012).
3. Id.
4. Christopher B. Field, et al., IPCC, 2014: Summary for Policy Makers 6 (2014),
http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WGIIAR5-SPM_FINAL.pdf. 
5. See id.
 6. See CHRIS WOLD ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 2 (2d. ed. 2013).
7. See id. at 826. 
8. See Insurance Information Institute, Industry Overview: Insurance Industry at
a Glance, III.ORG (Sept. 9, 2015, 11:40 AM), http://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/industry-
overview.
 9. Id. 
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on a small, local scale at first, but as the concerns accumulate the state,
and eventually federal, governments will likely be persuaded to listen. 
In this comment, Part II discusses how an insurance company operates 
as a business. Part III describes how insurance companies have dealt with
climate change thus far.  Then Part IV evaluates how insurance companies 
can shift the burden off themselves as the main party economically
responsible after climate change-related disaster by exploring what other
entities can share the burden and under what reasoning. Lastly, Part
V explains how the role of insurance companies in climate change litigation 
will be a driving force behind law and policy reform.
II. BASICS OF HOW INSURANCE COMPANIES WORK
Insurance provides the benefits of reimbursing people and businesses
for covered losses, encouraging accident prevention, providing funds for 
investment, enabling people to borrow money, and reducing worry and
stress related to accidents or unfortunate events that may occur.10 State
governments regulate and oversee insurance companies and thus insurance
laws vary from state to state.11  Each state has its own agency, headed by 
its own chief insurance regulator who is responsible for administering the
insurance laws approved by their state legislature.12  Insurance companies
work within these state regulations to evaluate the risks a client may face 
versus the potential of exposure to that risk and determine if it is willing to
offer protection to the client.13  To evaluate risk, insurance companies have
large underwriting departments dedicated to assessing risk concerns of
potential clients and determining how much coverage the client should 
receive, the cost of the client’s premium, or whether even to accept the
client.14  Once the insurance company agrees to insure a client, the firm
starts collecting fees called premiums from the client, and then pools these
premiums to redistribute to claimants as claims arise to satisfy policies.15
 10. See id.
 11. RICHARD H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW
89 (5th ed. 2012).
12. See id. 
13. See Jack A. Jones, An Introduction to Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR), 
5–6, 8 (2005), www.riskmanagementinsight.com/media/docs/FAIR_introduction.pdf. 
14. Id. at 8. 
15. See Ins. Inst. of Mich., How Insurance Works, (Feb. 17, 2015, 9:38 PM),
www.iiminfo.org/consumers/howisnuranceworks/tabid/1714/default.aspx.
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Insurance companies make money in two ways: 1) by charging enough 
premiums to cover the expected payouts necessary to cover over the life 
of the policy and 2) by earning investment returns using the collected
premiums.16  A combined loss ratio of 95–98% indicated in end of the year 
financial reports is generally considered excellent performance.17  This  
means that, with exemplary performance, insurance companies are only 
keeping 2–5% of premiums they receive as profit.18 
Reinsurance companies are the entities that provide insurance companies
with insurance against massive claim payouts.19  The goal of reinsurance
is to reduce an insurance company’s exposure to loss by passing on some
of the risk to the reinsurer.20  Reinsurance allows insurance companies to take
on more clients because it distributes the risk insurance companies normally
face alone across multiple entities and money pools reducing the financial
impact of mass claims.21 
The extent climate change will impact weather patterns is still unknown 
and almost impossible to determine with any certainty due to wide variances 
in future data.22  These variances make insurability uncertain because the
current models are now unreliable in calculating the probability, frequency,
and magnitude of risks associated with weather with enough accuracy to 
be economically viable.  Insurance companies’ risk assessment will change 
as the effects of climate change become more prevalent; insurance companies 
will take on fewer clients due to fear of taking on a bad investment and also
have to cover more claims to existing clients because of worsening weather 
effects. Clients will be less likely to attain a level of insurance necessary to 
protect their assets and insurance companies will have a dramatic drop in 
profits. This will spur both clients and the insurance companies to demand 
climate change law and policy reform and actions to mitigate the effects of
climate change. Reinsurance companies face the same problems insurance
companies face relating to climate change. 
16. See Ins. Bureau of Can., What My Insurance Company Does With My Premiums 
(Sept. 5, 2015, 7:41 PM), http://www.ibc.ca/on/insurance-101/insurance-basics/insurance-
premium-allocation.
 17. David Hampson, How Insurance Companies Evaluate Risk and Rate Your




19. See Gary S. Patrik, Reinsurance, in REINSURANCE PRACTICES 343 (1997), http://www. 
casact.org/library/studynotes/ch7.pdf.
20. See id.
 21. See id.
22.  Wold et al., supra note 6, at 1–3. 
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III. CHANGES TO INSURANCE COMPANIES DUE TO CLIMATE CHANGE
There is a continuing significant upward trend23 in the amount insurance 
companies pay out due to damage caused by extreme weather events.24 
The IPCC predicts that the occurrence of more severe and more frequent 
extreme weather events will lead to increased losses and loss variability
in several regions, consequently burdening the insurance systems that
have to offer affordable coverage while raising more risk-based capital.25 
Insurance companies consider climate change an emerging risk, which 
is a risk that has not yet fully developed and cannot yet be accurately
measured.26  Insurance companies can no longer calculate risk assessment 
with the accuracy needed to retain the current level of profitability.  The 
insurance industry’s ability to predict, measure, and price risk is affected
by climate change and its unpredictable consequences.27  Risk management
formulas will need to develop multi-model scenarios in order to more
accurately predict the impacts of climate change.  Insurance policy writers
used historic data for the original underwriting of insurance policies, 
therefore accounted for the potential impacts of climate change. Current 
climate change factors render historic risk assessment models unable to 
accurately calculate the risks associated with future weather and natural 
disasters.28  The lack of consistent observational data due to climate change
leads to a multitude of possible occurrences, making it difficult to place
confidence in one model over another.29  The relationship between the rising 
risk levels and insurance demand, but decreasing self-protection, may create
uninsurable regions.30  (For example, private insurance companies in Florida
 23. Louis Perroy, Conference Report, Impacts of Climate Change on Financial 
Institutions’ Medium to Long Term Assets and Liabilities (June 14, 2005), http://sias.
org.uk/resources/papers/?resource_id=351&type=papers.
24. Robert E.T. Ward et al., The Role of Insurers in Promoting Adaptation to
the Impacts of Climate Change, THE GENEVA PAPERS 33, 133–39 (2008), https://www.geneva
association.org/media/246469/ga2008_gp33(1)_ward_et_al.pdf.
25.  Field et al., supra note 4, at 19. 
26. W.J.W. Botzen et al., Climate Change and Increased Risk for the Insurance 
Sector: A Global Perspective and an Assessment for the Netherlands 11–12 (2009), 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11069-009-9404-1/fulltext.html. 
27. Id. at 1. 
28. Ward, supra note 24, at 133. 
29. See id. at 134. 
30. See id. at 136–37. 
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will no longer offer insurance in areas most vulnerable to storms, leaving the
state-backed insurer to pick up over one million policies.31) 
Additionally, without a uniform meaning of climate change, insurance 
companies do not know the exact risk they are insuring against. Definitions 
and clarity are essential to insurance companies and how they operate.32 
Unfortunately, there is no single universally accepted definition of “climate
change” or even “global warming.”33 While “climate change” generally 
means something broader than “global warming,” consumers use the two 
almost interchangeably.34  Usage of terminology that carries different 
definitions creates legal uncertainty that insurance companies may not be 
prepared to deal with.35 
IV. ACTIONS TAKEN THUS FAR BY INSURANCE COMPANIES
Insurance companies are already reacting to the new pressures they are
facing from climate change-related pressures and have implemented a
number of strategies in an attempt to minimize lost profits.  For example, in
an attempt to stay profitable despite the increasing number of paid claims,
insurance companies have increased premiums.36 Insurance companies 
changed their method of risk assessment; they have turned to quantitative 
analysts to compile data to predict future climate change-related losses and
have raised premiums accordingly.  This risk assessment method change 
allowed insurers to still make $49 billion the year Hurricane Katrina hit, 
paying out only 71.5 cents to every dollar taken in, as opposed to the $1.27 
paid out to every dollar in the year of Hurricane Andrew.37  Insurance
companies who covered property in areas affected by hurricanes have 
learned from past “mistakes” and have increased their fees in response to 
increasingly severe and damaging hurricanes.38
 31. See Stacy Vanek Smith, More areas becoming uninsurable due to volatile 
weather, MARKETPLACE (Feb. 17, 2015 9:59 PM), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/ 
economy/weather-economy/more-areas-becoming-uninsurable-due-volatile-weather. 
32. AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co. 283 Va. 609, 614 [725 S.E.2d 532, 533–34]
(2012). (In granting Steadfast’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court focused
solely on the definition of “occurrence” in the policies, holding that the release of greenhouse 
gases into the atmosphere by AES did not constitute an “occurrence” as defined by the
policies).
33. Botzen et al., supra note 26, at 13. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. See McKenzie Funk, WINDFALL:THE BOOMING BUSINESS OF GLOBAL WARMING 108
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If insurance companies decide that it is no longer profitable for them to
cover property in an area because of the increased risk of damage from
powerful weather patterns, they can choose to cancel policies and leave
the area uninsurable, or only insurable at a great cost to the property owner.
After insurance companies are forced to pay out the large amount of claims
following a disaster, many companies decide to no longer insure properties 
in that area to protect themselves from future similar financial losses.39 
For example, both Allstate and State Farm dropped thousands of insurance
policies in areas affected by violent weather patterns, including thirty thousand 
canceled policies in the five boroughs of New York most devastated by
Hurricane Sandy alone.40  Reinsurance companies are also opting to 
not reinsure companies that insure in these storm prone locations.41  Some 
reinsurance companies are now opting to withdraw from an area following
financial losses and instead concentrating on domestic locations with better-
understood risks (locations that are less susceptible to climate change risks).42 
Some insurance companies are also already requiring additional climate 
change–related disclosures from their commercial clients to monitor and 
potentially quantify the affects climate change has on them.43  Insurance
companies are requesting climate change-related information from their
clients, such as through the Carbon Disclosure Project, the Dow Jones
Sustainability Indexes, and FTSE4Good.44  While insurance companies 
do not request the same information from their private clients, insurance
companies incentivize private policyholders to take actions by offering
discounts to property owners who make adaptations to their property.
After Hurricane Andrew, the Florida legislature introduced Statute 627.029
requiring insurance companies to give discounts to building owners who 
made adaptations to the structure to increase wind resistance.45 Similarly, 
insurance companies have taken initiative and have started offering 
discounts for building modifications that will limit potential damage, such
as installing impact-resistant roofing material or improving old fixtures 
such as pipes and wiring. 
39. Id. 
40. Id.




 43. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 2, at 97. 
44. Id. at 108. 
45. Ward, supra note 24, at 135. 
 147

































While insurance companies have taken a stand and have implemented 
several strategies for change, the issue of payouts for a large catastrophe
still exists. Insurance companies do not want to bear the main burden of 
economic relief after millions or billions of dollars worth of damages occur.
Insurance companies are likely to ask if the damage could have been
prevented, why it was not prevented, and who was potentially responsible 
for preventing it.  This raises the question of ultimate liability—a question
that has no definitive answer as of yet. 
Attempting to minimize their own financial loss after insured properties 
have been hit with the most damaging storms to date, some insurance 
companies have brought suit against the state government, local government,
or community entities for failing to take adequate precautions in preparing 
for such storms.  For example, Farmers Insurance filed a complaint against 
Chicago and surrounding communities for failing to take appropriate measures
to prevent damage caused by a severe storm.46  If insurance companies are
successful in getting damages from the local governments, States will
ultimately assume some of the climate change adaptation burden. Both states
and insurance companies should work together to remedy the situation as 
best they can instead of throwing financial responsibility back and forth
in order to mitigate the amount they are required to pay out.
Increased risk for insurance companies is only a problem if these
climate change-related risks are not accounted for in the risk assessments,
but not all insurance companies are looking to mitigate losses due to climate 
change.47  In fact, some insurance companies are actively looking to profit 
from the increasing pressure on property owners to be insured in case of
practically anything.48  Companies such as Eqecat and Risk Management 
Solutions are capitalizing on the uncertainty climate change brings to risk
assessment.49  Risk Management Solutions, for example, updated its hurricane 
model by flying four scientists to a vacation spot in Bermuda for expert 
elicitation.50  The scientists then produced a non-peer-reviewed report for
Risk Management Solutions, which sold the information to Allstate, which 
then used the information as a basis in an attempt to raise insurance premiums
by 43%.51  State regulators, however, blocked the raise in premiums.52
 46. Complaint at 14, Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Metro Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater
Chi., No. 140416 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 2014), available at http://www.rff.org/files/wordpress/
2014/05/Chicago-Flood-Insurance-Suit-.pdf. 
47. See Funk, supra note 36, at 107. 
48. Id. at 107–08. 
49. Id. at 108.
 50. Id.
 51. See id.
 52. Id.
148
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V. THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY
As damaging weather patterns and storms increase in frequency and 
severity, the question of who is liable for the sustained damages arises and
results in the parties pointing fingers at anyone but themselves.  Insurance 
companies are liable to pay out claims their clients make.  Property owners 
may have to cover the costs that exceed their insurance coverage or do not 
fall within their policy.  State and local governments may also be liable for
failing to develop a plan to prepare for worsened storms or other events.
What will happen if the probability, frequency, and magnitude of weather
patterns and storms can no longer be calculated to within an acceptable
range due to climate change? Do planning committees promulgated by local
governments to construct community projects have any obligation to adapt
their plans to an unpredictable future and, if so, how would they go about
it? 
Numerous plaintiffs, including insurance companies, have filed various
types of tort claims based on their damages that have resulted from climate
change.53  The claims have been based on negligence, inverse condemnation, 
public nuisance, and the public trust doctrine.54  Using negligence as a 
cause of action for damage caused by climate change-related disasters will
prove impractical.  Plaintiffs will have difficulty meeting the requirement of 
showing fault, a breach of standard of care, or the foreseeability of the harm 
due to climate change’s uncertain future impacts.  There has been some more 
recent success in using the theory of inverse condemnation to hold public
entities liable for the damage resulting from a severe storm.  Inverse 
condemnation, however, is a question of law and not fact and, as such, a
judge, not a jury, will decide it.55  While this allows for a person more 
knowledgeable in the law than a jury to hear and decide the issue, the science 
used by courts in their analysis is still evolving and often has political 
leanings.56 
Historically, there are five phases of massive tort recovery litigation: 
53. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 2, at 69. 
54. Id.; see Paterno v. State, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854, 857 (2003), as modified on denial of
reh’g (Dec. 24, 2003); Arreola v. Cnty. Of Monterey, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38, 57 (2002), as modified
on denial of reh’g (July 23, 2002). 
55. See ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON 
LAND-USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 96 (Island Press 1999). 
56. See id. at 96. 
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Phase I: Prospecting – Unsuccessful, intermittent strike claims based 
on myriad traditional tort recovery theories, designed largely to explore 
the boundaries for successful recoveries. 
Phase II: Defining – Increased regulatory activity supplying standards
by which the standard of care and causation can be established,
accompanied by increasing number of adapted claims.
Phase III: Refining – More sophisticated complaints supported by 
well-funded plaintiff’s attorneys, causing increased discovery costs 
and resulting in occasional ruling that permit claims to reach finders
of fact. 
Phase IV: Targeting – Intermittent settlement as litigation costs begin 
to systemically exceed discovery costs and vulnerable, targeted
defendants are found and fall. 
Phase V: Recovering – Plaintiff’s attorneys accumulate enough resources
and data to evenly battle industry targets, culminating in the ultimate 
collapse of industry targets.57 
Climate change-related litigation is in the beginning phases of massive
tort recovery litigation viability.  2011 was the first year that the Supreme 
Court of the United States decided a climate change-related tort case in
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP).58  The Court addressed 
federal common law nuisance claims, instead of state tort claims, and 
claims for injunctive relief, not monetary damages.59  This leaves open the
possibilities for litigation at the state level.  Plaintiffs will likely use the 
successful claims of AEP, such as going after state-level litigation, as a
base for structuring state claims.  Currently, plaintiffs are bringing claims
under various doctrines and theories and attempting to see what “sticks”.60 
There have been many dismissed cases, but as the number of plaintiffs who 
feel they are owed damages increases, climate change-related litigation will 
gain steam and an increasing number of claims will “stick.” 
One important factor plaintiffs need to know is whom exactly they need 
to bring suit against.  There are many possibilities, including governments,
insurance companies, and businesses, but as litigation develops, proper
defendants will become more clear.
 57. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 2, at 23–24. 
58. Id. at 71. 
59. Id. at 75. 
60. See id.
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A. Liability of the Insurance Companies 
Insurance companies have been affected by emerging risks in the past, 
including such risks as asbestos and tobacco.61 Asbestos and tobacco
related claims did not start with high priority in the courts or in the 
political arena.62 Courts easily dismissed early claims arising from both 
asbestos and tobacco as too tenuous, but as time and data progressed both 
asbestos and tobacco claims became increasingly harder to deny and 
eventually became accepted by the courts resulting in large monetary
awards.63  Climate change-related claims are falling into the same pattern. 
As the scientific community gains a growing consensus through data and 
research analysis and there continues to be congressional inaction, the
likelihood for climate change–related mega-recoveries continues to grow.64 
The vast number and variety of economic sectors and demographics affected
by climate change are far greater than the plaintiff groups in past emerging
risk litigation of asbestos and tobacco.  These differences will likely result 
in different drivers and patterns of claims behind climate change-related
litigation. 
In tobacco litigation history, the tobacco industry notoriously boasted
of never having lost to a consumer in litigation.65  As data piled up showing 
the correlation between smoking and health hazards, the tobacco industry
ultimately had to pay billions of dollars to states and individuals.66  Similar 
to the rise of tobacco litigation, legislatures historically held little concern 
to climate change.67  But as scientists and administrative agencies come
to a consensus about the facts and detriments of climate change, climate 
change-related claims gain a stronger foundation, which increases the 
likelihood of success.68  Most importantly, in tobacco litigation, there was
never a finding that tobacco was “the” cause of cancer, just “a” cause.69  This
suggests all climate change-related plaintiffs need to show is that climate 
61. Id. at 22. 
62. See id.
 63. See id. at 22–23. 
64. Id. at 23. 
65. Id. at 22. 












      
 
  























   
    
   
  
     
  
change is “a” cause of the damages sustained and not necessarily that it was 
“the” cause.70 
Similar to past tobacco litigation, a core point of climate change tort 
litigation is the emphasis that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are “a” cause
of climate change, not “the” cause.71  The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has already begun the process of establishing objective criteria for
the development of standards to evaluate greenhouse gas emitting activities.72 
For businesses that regularly emit GHGs, these standards could translate
into liability for those who have produced the most GHGs because this would 
create a record of emissions useful for showing the company helped with
a known cause of climate change.  Thus, these companies could be held
responsible for damage caused by worsening weather patterns and the
liability would, therefore, also transfer to the GHG emitter’s insurance
providers.
At the same time, however, it can be argued that all businesses and every
individual emit GHGs and therefore no one is “owed” anything, everyone is 
liable for their own damages, because they are also participating in the
harmful activity.73  This theory of universal participation is fundamentally
different than in tobacco claims.  In tobacco claims, there were people actively
participating in smoking cigarettes and using other tobacco products. In
tobacco related claims, people were being harmed against their will despite
actively choosing not to participate in the activity, while in climate change
litigation almost everyone participates by default. Almost everyone emits 
GHGs by using electricity, heating their homes, and driving around town, 
there is not a truly “innocent” party in climate-change related litigation.74 
As asbestos litigation came to its peak, plaintiffs could sue insurers
directly if the plaintiffs could show insurers had knowledge of asbestos as 
an emerging risk and other potential targets became insolvent.75  A similar 
scenario could occur in climate change-related lawsuits as insurers
respond to increasing number of severe storms and other weather related
claims.  Some individuals successfully brought product liability claims,
including failure to warn and design defect, against manufacturers of 
asbestos.76  Product liability claims could translate over to climate change-
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See EPA, REGULATIONS & STANDARDS (2015), http://www.epa.gov/NSR/actions.
html (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
73. See GREENHOUSE GASES, http://www.epa.gov/climatestudents/basics/today/
greenhouse-gases.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
74. See id.
75. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 2, at 3.
76. See id. at 87.
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related litigation against insurers.77  The claims would allege GHG emitters
failed to warn consumers that the products emitted GHGs known to 
aggravate climate change.78  If the insurers are found to have failed to take
the necessary steps to warn clients or include climate change appropriately 
in risk analysis and policies when there is information available about GHG 
emission levels and data about the impact of climate change, individuals 
can succeed in their claim that insurance companies failed to warn them
accordingly.79  Because insurance companies are designed to financially 
protect clients against risk, if they fail to do so, clients can allege policy defects
in the insurance companies’ product.
Climate change, however, is not a manufactured product in the same 
way both tobacco and asbestos are.  Courts will likely be discouraged against 
allowing product liability or defect claims that were successful in asbestos 
litigation in climate change-related litigation because climate change is 
not an intended product in the same sense.  Additionally, these product liability
or defect claims would suffer the same causation issues as other tort claims
as well as the issues climate change-related litigation has already been plagued 
with establishing standing, displacement or preemption by federal laws and
regulations, and the political question doctrine.80 
Climate change-related claims may follow in the footsteps of past 
emerging risk litigation, but they are fundamentally different than tobacco
and asbestos related claims.  Insurance companies are there to protect against 
potential risks, emerging or established, and provide services to do so. 
Plaintiffs will likely find success similar to the asbestos litigation because
of the relationship the information has on the insurance company’s product.
Recognition by insurance companies can likely be proved because many 
insurance companies already classify climate change as an emerging risk and, 
thus, formally recognize it.81  Plaintiffs could potentially bring claims against 
the insurance companies based on their knowledge of the risks associated
with climate change.82 
Property owners, as well as state and local governments, can potentially 
bring suit against the insurance companies for failing to adequately adapt 
their economic models to handle large-scale payouts.  In 2005, Gulf Coast 
77. Id.
 78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id.
81. Botzen et al., supra note 26, at 21. 
82. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 2, at 23. 
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property owners filed suit against mortgage and insurance companies.83 
“The plaintiffs alleged that the insurers wrongfully denied coverage for 
hurricane-related damage pursuant to water damage exclusions and that 
the mortgage companies failed to obtain adequate insurance for the
mortgaged properties.”84  While climate change litigation is still emerging 
and plaintiffs will continue to face problems establishing standing, proving 
causation, and displacement or preemption by federal laws and regulations, 
insurance companies could still indirectly face responsibility for climate 
change-related incidents through the costs of defending themselves in
litigation, even if the initial claims are unsuccessful.85 
As an added concern, as climate change-related claims increase,
policyholders faced with these claims may seek insurance coverage specific
to protecting themselves against these types of claims.86  This could lead 
to insurance companies being financially responsible for damages even 
when the company has otherwise distanced itself from liability. 
B. State and Local Government Liability 
Inverse condemnation is one claim that has seen success in recent
climate change-related litigation.87  An inverse condemnation claim is a 
takings claim with the parties reversed.88  An inverse condemnation claim
allows the property owner to sue the government when the government 
takes property without first paying for the right to do so.89  Some states 
allow for an inverse condemnation claim to be brought when the property
is only damaged instead of taken.90  Two California cases address the issue
of liability when floodwaters cause property damage.91  State and local 
governments have both have an active role in protecting their residents; 
part of that role includes planning and constructing projects designed to 
keep the residents safe from naturally occurring risks, such as floods, fires, 
and strong winds.  Arreola v. County of Monterey92 and Paterno v. State
of California93 both deal with property damage caused by the failure of 
83. Id. at 82.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 87.
86. Id. at 70.
87. See Paterno, supra note 54, at 857; Arreola, supra note 54, at 754.
88. David L. Callies, Takings: Physical and Regulatory, 15 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 77,
95 (2007), available at http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/handle/10125/ 
34811/Callies_15AsiaPacLRev77.pdf?sequence=1. 
89. Paterno, supra note 54, at 866.
90. U.S. CONST. amend. V; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19.
91. See Paterno, supra note 54, at 857; Arreola, supra note 54, at 730.
92. Arreola, supra note 54.
93. Paterno, supra note 54.
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state and local government flood-control projects.94  Courts will inadvertently
decide insurance companies’ roles in future cases these by determining
liability in similar cases.  If the courts find liability lies with the state, state 
funds will cover the damages.  If liability lies elsewhere, however, insurance
companies have a higher chance of being responsible for damage on covered
properties. 
1. Examples of Liability: Arreola v. County of Monterey and 
Paterno v. State of  California
The Federal Flood Control Act of 1944 authorized the United States 
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to construct earthen levees along the 
Pajaro River that runs along the border of Santa Cruz County and
Monterey County in California.95  The project was designed to handle
19,000 cubic feet per second (c.f.s.), not including the safety “freeboard” 
amount of an additional 4,000 c.f.s.96  The Corps turned over operation 
and maintenance of the levees, upon receipt of assurances, to the local
agencies.97  Maintenance of the levees required clearing vegetation and 
sand that would otherwise build up.98  Without this maintenance, the capacity
of the levee would be diminished in proportion to how much sand and
vegetation accumulated.99 Continuous mechanized clearing of the levees
took place until 1972 when the local agencies stopped mechanically clearing
the levees due to competing environmental concerns over the protection
of the environment, such as wildlife protection.100  Failure to mechanically
clear the levees allowed vegetation and sandbars to build up and impede 
the flow of water.101 
During the same time period, the State of California constructed
Highway 1, which crosses the Pajaro River in an area containing natural 
water drainage.102  A man-made drainage system was constructed.103 The 
98 c.f.s. system was built in accordance with the state’s requirement that 
94. See id. at 1003; Arreola, supra note 54, at 730. 
95. See Arreola, supra note 54, at 733. 
96. Id. at 733. 
97. Id. at 732. 
98. See id. at 733–34. 
99. See id.
 100. Id. at 733.
 101. Id. 
102. Id. at 735–36. 
103. Id. at 736. 
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the system be able to discharge a 100-year flood without causing water to 
back up, however, the state did not require the drainage system to
accommodate overflows from the levees.104 
In March 1995, heavy rainfall hit an area of the levee and Highway 1.105 
The vegetation and sand that had accumulated in the channel since 1972 
caused the Parajo River flow to be higher and water rushed over the levee, 
eroding the backside of the levee and flooding the surrounding valley.106 
This water reached the Highway 1 embankment, where the water backed
up. The failure to mechanically clear the levees caused extensive flooding 
and damages because the drainage system was not designed to handle that 
amount of water.107 
In order to be held liable for the damage caused by the floodwaters, 
plaintiffs had to show that the public agency’s design, construction, or 
maintenance posed an unreasonable risk of harm, and that the unreasonable
design, construction, or maintenance was a substantial cause of the 
damages.108 The Arreola court explained, “the necessary finding is that the
wrongful act be part of the deliberate design, construction, or maintenance of
the public improvement.”109  The court held it was enough to prove the
government was aware of the risk posed and deliberately chose a course 
of action.110  In this case, that choice was inaction by failing to mechanically 
clear the levees, in the face of that known risk.111  The court found that
inadequate project maintenance does support inverse condemnation
liability.112 
The Arreola court applied the Locklin factors to determine if the project
fell outside of the scope of reasonableness allowed for damage caused by
floods.113  The Locklin factors are:
(1) the overall purpose served by the project; (2) to what extent losses are offset
by reciprocal benefits provided by the project; (3) the availability of alternatives
to the plan adopted; (4) the severity of the plaintiff’s damage in relation to risk-
bearing capabilities; (5) the extent to which the damage is a normal risk of land
ownership; and (6) the degree to which damage is distributed at large over the 
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The courts apply these factors only in cases where improvements failed 
and the damaged property has been historically subject to flooding.115 The
Arreola court further reasoned that the rule of reasonableness recited in 
Locklin should not apply to Highway 1 because Highway 1 was not a flood 
control project and therefore would not implicate public policy considerations 
of discouraging flood control projects.116  The court found the State 
of California strictly liable in this case because they let the levee back up
with debris, meaning the flooding was foreseeable.  California had a duty
to avoid obstructing floodwater and plaintiffs were not expected to take 
measures to protect their lands from state caused harm.
Paterno is similar to Arreola, but had a different result. In Paterno, a
levee was constructed to protect the Linda Township in the Sacramento 
Valley sometime before 1881.117  The Corps subsequently issued the
Sacramento River Flood Control Project (SRFCP), which included plans
for levees, bypasses, and other flood control works.118  California approved 
the SRFCP in 1925 and Linda levee was incorporated into the SRFCP.119 
The Corps improved the Linda levee in 1934 and in 1940; the levee was 
designed to hold up to an elevation of 80 feet of water.120  Once the Corps
completed the improvements on the Linda levee, it then transferred the
maintenance and control of the levee to the State of California in 1953.121 
In 1986, a tropical storm weather system raised the water level at the levee 
up to 76 feet.122 The levee failed when the water had receded to about half
its designed capacity, which triggered flooding that caused damage to
Paterno’s property.123 
The Corps built the levee on non-compacted land due to previous
hydraulic mining that was done in the area.124  The levee failed because of
underground water channels that made it more susceptible to seepage.125 The 
seepage eroded soil from underneath the levee, resulting in a weakened 
115. See Harry D. Miller & Basil S. Shiber, Inverse Condemnation, MILLER AND STARR 
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foundation that could not withstand the pressure of the water.126 The court
found California liable for the damage caused by the failure of the levee 
because the State incorporated the levee into a flood control plan without
ensuring design and construction standards were met.  The court remanded 
the case down to the lower courts to analyze it in accordance with the then 
unreleased Locklin factors.
A major difference between the two California cases is that in Paterno
the County originally built the levee and then the State of California 
subsequently accepted responsibility for the maintenance of the levee, as 
opposed to the levee in Arreola, which was designed and built by the Corps 
and the County subsequently accepted responsibility for the levee.127 In 
Paterno, the State’s acceptance of responsibility for the levee and its 
exercise of dominion and control over it, made it liable for the failure of 
the levee even though the levee was originally designed and built by Yuba
County.128  Yuba County was not liable because it had only been responsible
for ordinary maintenance and did not have the authority to alter the structure
of the levee to prevent its collapse.129  The Paterno court determined that
an unreasonable State plan, not a Yuba County plan, caused the levee to 
fail and, therefore, caused the damages.130  The Paterno court explained
that the traditional Locklin principles apply in cases where improvements
fail and damage occurs to property located in areas historically subject to 
flooding.131  If the property was not located in an area historically subject 
to flooding, the reasonableness standard did not apply, and the public 
agency was strictly liable for the damage.132  The court in Paterno further 
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Another significance of Paterno was the court’s application of the
“acceptance doctrine” to the State of California.  Under the acceptance
doctrine, when a public entity accepts responsibility for an improvement,
it becomes that entity’s public improvement regardless of who built it.139 
A public agency can accept a project through implied official acts of control 
over the property or by continued acts of maintenance and improvements 
over the years.140 The acceptance doctrine applies equally to both strict 
liability cases and to those requiring an analysis of the reasonableness 
standard.141 
2. New Instance of Liability: Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Metro
Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago 
In Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Metro. Water Reclamation District
of Greater Chicago, Farmers Insurance alleged that the Reclamation District
and Chicago-area governments breached their duty to store storm water
safely and to repair property damage from the resulting flood.142 Farmers 
alleged that the defendants were responsible for flood damage caused by
the overflowing storm basins.  The defendants allegedly relied solely on
historical data and failed to account for the effects of climate change when 
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projections indicated greater rainfall than in the past, the defendants had 
a duty to plan for the increase.
The central issue in the Illinois Farmers case was whether the defendants
maintained their storm water basins, sewers, and drains unsafely.  Farmers
noted that the Reclamation District published, and was therefore aware of,
several watershed plans that “identified known storm water sewer . . . 
management defects.”143  Moreover, Farmers Insurance claimed that the
defendants knew of the lack of capacity because there was evidence that
the defendants would pump the reservoirs to reduce the water levels before
anticipated storms.144  The basins required additional capacity due to increases 
in rainfall associated with climate change.  This increase overwhelmed
the current infrastructure and rendered the historical rainfall data obsolete.145 
By adopting “the scientific principle that climate change has caused increases
in rainfall,” the Plaintiffs claim the Reclamation District acknowledged a 
causal link between climate change and heavier rainfall.146  In short,
Defendants allegedly knew that the storm basins were insufficient and
failed to cure it.  Thus, Farmers Insurance alleged a breach of the defendant’s
duty to the victims.
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Since the case has subsequently been dismissed, it is unknown now 
whether the plaintiffs in Illinois Farmers actually intended to pursue the 
case or whether the plaintiffs merely intended to cause a stir and put local
governments on notice that they may face litigation if they do not adapt to 
climate change.  The plaintiffs’ attorneys must have known that the case 
would be an uphill battle because of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, which
limits the tort liabilities of municipalities, and the novelty of the claim and
the cost of litigation.149 The claims behind this case, however, have 
established an additional approach climate change-related litigants could 
utilize in future actions.  Courts are familiar with the types of claims presented 
in the Illinois Farmers case.  This familiarity with these underlying theories 
will allow both litigants and courts to use known strategies and reasoning 
to further climate change-related litigation and help reduce the uncertainty 








locate the information, pre
Pote
this extra step because of the extra tim

























































sent it in an organized f
deterred 



















 clients puts a 
gh-risk areas 









 will take and 












change adaptation methods 
n a
tentionally or not. 
.












































































































                          
149. See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/101.1 (2015). 
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To combat climate change-related risk, insurers can develop new products
that specifically address the risks unique to climate change.150  For example, 
insurers could put restrictions on underwriting certain industries, develop 
new underwriting guidelines for emerging industries, change prices and
risk profiles, as well as include new or revised exclusions to policies.151  Any
of these will spur climate change reform as private and commercial entities
alike will apply adaptation methods to fit within the new polices in order 
to keep their insurance coverage.
Insurance and reinsurance companies have also developed the Institute 
for Business and Home Safety (IBHS) which researches and advocates for 
improved construction, maintenance, and preparation practices for natural 
disasters.152 Similarly, American International Group, Inc. has taken 
adaptation initiative and formed its own mini-fire department supplying
firefighters and engines designated to protect client property.153 
Climate change-related claims and litigation are still in their formative 
years. If history repeats itself and follows the similar tactics used in asbestos
and tobacco litigation, climate change-related claims will gain steam and
ultimately result in huge damage awards.154  These payouts could come 
from insurance companies.  The large polluters primarily responsible for 
climate change effects may become insolvent due to defense and payout
costs in previous litigation, causing plaintiffs to come after the insurance 
company of the polluting business.155 Plaintiffs in asbestos litigation targeted
insurers directly as solvent defendants became increasingly rare by using 
claims that stemmed from the insurers’ failure to disclose information
about the regarding dangers associated with asbestos to an uninformed
public.156  As scientific data showing the correlation between polluting 
companies and climate change becomes more available, more accurate, 
and better-understood, insurers will be aware of climate change consequences 
and therefore may be pulled in as parties to climate change-related claims.157 
For example, in 2008, Liberty Mutual offered the world’s first insurance 
policy to protect corporate executives from lawsuits alleging “improper 
release of carbon dioxide.”158  This increases the likelihood Liberty Mutual
150. Botzen et al., supra note 26, at 9.
 151. Id.
 152. Ward, supra note 24, at 134–35. 
153. Daniel Taub, AIG’s Fire Trucks Save Homes of Wealthy Californians, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 20, 2014, 10:03 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=news 
archive&sid=akG9v3rOnWsE.
 154. See CARROLL ET AL., supra note 2, at 22. 
155. See id.
 156. Id. at 3. 
157. See id.
 158. FUNK, supra note 36, at 100. 
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could be brought in as a party because they have official recognized climate- 
change related claims.159 
Liability for damage caused by climate change-related disasters is not 
yet clearly determined.  Just how vigorously insurance companies lobby 
for change in climate change policy and law will likely be determined by
who is liable for the damage caused by climate change-worsened weather
patterns. If the state has liability, insurance companies will probably
not react as strongly.  State funds would cover the damages and insurers would 
potentially have a claim against the state, as seen in Paterno and Arreola. 
Bringing suit against the state would be a long and potentially costly
endeavor, but is still a possibility.  As long as the insurers could show they
had a significant interest in the property, they could bring an inverse
condemnation claim and be awarded monetary damages, a type of 
reimbursement for the funds lost due to massive claim payouts. 
Both Paterno and Arreola lay a foundation for subsequent litigants in 
California and the Illinois Farmers case outlines yet another potential
litigation strategy.  An entity is a proper defendant if the entity substantially
participated in the planning, approval, construction, or operation of a public
project or improvement that proximately caused injury to private property.160 
This opens the door for plaintiffs to bring suits against third party contractors
that may have been hired to facilitate planning and construction, or any
other party that was substantially involved. Climate change-related tort cases
have implications for commercial general liability and environmental general 
liability business lines.161  Plaintiff bars will find inverse condemnation should 
always be alleged in a complaint against a government entity or public utility. 
If the facts support the cause of action, the burden of proof required of a 
plaintiff is much less stringent than that of negligence or dangerous condition 
of public property causes of action.  Also, a plaintiff who prevails under inverse 
condemnation is entitled to recovery of attorneys’ fees and reasonable costs.162 
Inverse condemnation is available to an insurance carrier because they 
have a significant interest in the property.163  A takings claim allows the property 
owner to sue for inverse condemnation where the government damages 
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those that have an interest in property taken by a government entity, 
including insurance companies, are entitled to seek recovery through
inverse condemnation.165  As businesses go under due to not being able to 
economically deal with the effects of climate change, plaintiffs can go 
after those businesses’ insurance companies.  There are at least 23 other 
states that have inverse condemnation clauses, including Illinois, making
it a possible cause of action in Farmers’ suit against Chicago.166  Inverse
condemnation claims require the owner of the property to sue the government 
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If the polluters have liability, however, insurance companies may opt 
for a more aggressive strategy to influence climate change law and policy.
Major businesses and corporations carry insurance designed to protect them
from having to pay out large sums of money.  If, as history has shown
through the asbestos and tobacco industries, climate change-related suits 
begin to be brought more frequently and won by plaintiffs more often, the 
entities that pollute the most will be unable to stay solvent.  Plaintiffs could
then come after the insolvent entity’s insurance company.  Insurance 
companies want to protect themselves. 
In Turner v. Murphy Oil,169 home and business owners affected by an
oil spill from the Murphy Oil refinery in Louisiana caused by Hurricane 
Katrina alleged Murphy Oil failed to properly secure and maintain oil storage 
tanks.170  However, prior to the first stage of the scheduled bifurcated trial 
the parties settled out of court for $339,126,000.171  While settling matters out
of court on negotiated terms allows companies and their insurers to stay
solvent and pay out on their own terms, it puts money into the plaintiff’s 
165. See Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 216 Cal. Rptr. 831, 835–37 (Ct. 
App. 1985).
166. Cozen O’Connor, Jurisdictions Comparative Chart: Inverse Condemnation (2010), 
http://www.cozen.com/cozendocs/outgoing/charts/chartofthemonth/inverse_condemnation.
pdf.
167. JAMES G. GREILSHEIMER & CYNTHIA LOVINGER SIDERMAN, Inverse Condemnation, 
in EMINENT DOMAIN:A BOOK OF CONDEMNATION LAW 123 (William Scheiderich, Cynthia 
M. Fraser & David Callies eds., A.B.A. 2011). 
168. See Paterno, supra note 54, at 1031. 
169.  Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 597, 606–08 (E.D. La. 2006). 
170. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 2, at 81–82. 
171. Id. at 82. 
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bar “war fund” and can inspire plaintiffs to bring even more tort cases related 
to specific climate change-related disasters.172 
Insurance companies need to look at the history of mega-payout claims 
and analyze the risk they face against climate change and related litigation. 
Insurance companies survived the asbestos and tobacco litigation, and 
they will likely survive climate change-related litigation, the costs can be 
mitigated, however, with early action.  It would still be economically beneficial 
for insurers to lobby for climate change mitigation and adaptation methods. 
VII. CONCLUSION
Insurance companies can become the driving force behind climate 
change law and policy reform.  The insurance industry has a hand in every
other sector of the economy and is therefore especially susceptible to climate
change effects.  As the effects of climate change become more widely felt 
and increase in severity, the insurance industry will feel every impact. 
Through self-preservation tactics, such as raising premiums and filing 
lawsuits against parties partially responsible for climate change related
damages, insurance companies could drive the change towards a stricter
and more comprehensive climate change policy in the United States.  A
powerful industry such as the insurance sector has a lot of money and 
leverage to put behind policies that it supports.  Insurance companies could 
lobby to hold state and/or local governments as the parties held liable for 
damages caused by climate change-related harm.  Holding state and local 
governments liable will shift the burden onto these parties and incentivize 
state and local governments to promote adaptation and mitigation plans 
and effectively implement and further innovate such plans. 
172. Id. 
 165
DAILY (DO NOT DELETE) 8/9/2016 3:35 PM      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 166
 
